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Abstract
This paper considers the distributed strategy design for Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in multi-cluster games under a partial-decision
information scenario. In the considered game, there are multiple clusters and each cluster consists of a group of agents. A cluster is viewed
as a virtual noncooperative player that aims to minimize its local payoff function and the agents in a cluster are the actual players that
cooperate within the cluster to optimize the payoff function of the cluster through communication via a connected graph. In our setting,
agents have only partial-decision information, that is, they only know local information and cannot have full access to opponents’ decisions.
To solve the NE seeking problem of this formulated game, a discrete-time distributed algorithm, called distributed gradient tracking
algorithm (DGT), is devised based on the inter- and intra-communication of clusters. In the designed algorithm, each agent is equipped
with strategy variables including its own strategy and estimates of other clusters’ strategies. With the help of a weighted Fronbenius norm
and a weighted Euclidean norm, theoretical analysis is presented to rigorously show the linear convergence of the algorithm. Finally, a
numerical example is given to illustrate the proposed algorithm.
Key words: Nash equilibrium seeking, multi-cluster games, partial-decision information, distributed gradient tracking algorithm.
1 Introduction
Game theory, which has been found to be a powerful tool
to deal with optimization problems arising in multi-agent
systems with the objective functions being coupled through
decision variables of agents, has various applications includ-
ing competitive markets [1], smart grids [2], transport sys-
tems [3], to name just a few. A challenging issue in games
is to design strategies to find a Nash equilibrium (NE) cor-
responding to the desirable and stable state, from which
no agents want to deviate. Some references, such as [4–6],
made an assumption that each agent can access all the com-
petitors’ decisions, which is impractical since a central node
with bidirectional communication with all the players must
exit in such case.
Therefore, in recent years, most scholars have focused on
distributed algorithms for seeking Nash equilibria of nonco-
operative games composed of selfish decision-makers. For
example, a payoff-based scheme was proposed in [7, 8],
where each player is required to measure its cost function
but not to communicate with others. In most circumstances,
a player may not be aware of other players’ strategies, i.e., in
a partial-decision information scenario. To handle such kind
Email addresses: minmeng@ntu.edu.sg (Min Meng),
xxli@ieee.org (Xiuxian Li).
of partial-decision information scenarios, many results on
the NE seeking problems were obtained both in continuous-
time [9,10] and in discrete-time [11–14], in which gradient
and consensus based algorithms were designed to estimate
other players’ strategies relying on local information. The
algorithms in [11, 12] equipped with vanishing step sizes
may have a slower convergence than those in [13,14] where
fixed-step schemes were applied. Another technique used
in [15, 16] was to apply the operator theoretic theory since
an NE can be characterized as a zero point of a monotone
operator.
In contrast to noncooperative games, distributed optimiza-
tion concerns a network of agents that collaborate to mini-
mize the global cost function [17–22]. This problem is also
an active research topic and has wide applications in resource
allocation, machine learning, sensor networks, and energy
systems [23]. Competition and cooperation among agents
always coexist in many practical situations, such as health-
care networks [24], transportation networks [25] and so on.
These practical situations may not be well modeled by only
noncooperative games or distributed optimization problems.
Inspired by the coexistence of competition and cooperation
among agents, a multi-cluster (or multi-coalition) game was
formulated in [26]. This game is conducted by multiple clus-
ters (or coalitions), each of which is regarded as a virtual
selfish player and aims to minimize its local payoff func-
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tion. The agents in the same cluster are the actual players
that cooperate within the cluster to optimize the payoff func-
tion of the cluster through communication via a connected
graph. Then, a newNE seeking strategy was designed in [27]
to reduce the communication and computation costs com-
pared with that in [26]. In [28], the authors investigated the
NE seeking problem of multi-cluster games without explicit
expressions of the agents’ local objective functions by an
extremum seeking-based approach. Furthermore, a general-
ized NE seeking strategy was given for multi-cluster games
with nonsmooth payoff functions, a coupled of nonlinear
inequality constraint and set constraints [29].
However, all the above existing distributed algorithms
for seeking Nash equilibria of multi-cluster games are in
continuous-time and under full-decision information, i.e.,
each agent has access to all agents’ decisions that influ-
ence its cost. As discrete-time algorithms are easily im-
plemented in practical applications, in this paper, we aim
to design a distributed discrete-time algorithm for seek-
ing an NE of multi-cluster games under partial-decision
information. In the studied multi-cluster game, the payoff
function of a cluster is defined as the average sum of local
payoff functions of its agents and every cluster designates
a representative agent to interact with other representative
agents from other clusters through an arbitrary connected
network. With the aid of the available local information,
each agent makes estimations of other clusters’ strategies
and the gradient of its cluster’s payoff function at every
iteration. Based on the inter- and intra-communication, a
distributed gradient tracking algorithm (DGT) is devised to
find the NE of the studied multi-cluster game. Under some
mild conditions, by introducing a weighted Frobenius norm
and a weighted Euclidean norm, the algorithm is rigorously
proved to converge to the NE at a linear rate. Finally, we
present a numerical example of Cournot Competition games
to illustrate the developed algorithm.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
1) This paper investigates distributed NE seeking for multi-
cluster games under partial-decision information. Com-
pared with related works [26–29], where continuous-time
algorithmswere designed under full-decision information,
this paper gives a discrete-time algorithm based on local
information only.
2) The investigated problem includes distributed NE seeking
of noncooperative games and distributed optimization as
special cases. The designed algorithm is consistent with
that in [14] on distributed NE seeking for noncooperative
games when there is only one agent in every cluster, and
with that in [19] on distributed optimization when only
one cluster is evolved.
3) Rigorous convergence analysis is presented by defining
a weighted Fronbenius norm and a weighted Euclidean
norm induced by a new Frobenius inner product and a
new dot product, respectively. Moreover, the convergence
of the devised algorithm can be achieved at a linear rate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
the problem formulation is introduced. Section 3 presents
the main result and the proof of main result is given in
Section 4. Section 5 uses a numerical example to show the
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. Section 6 makes a
brief conclusion.
Notations. Let R, Rn and Rm×n be the sets of real numbers,
n-dimensional real column vectors and m×n real matrices,
respectively. For an integer n> 0, denote [n] := {1,2, . . . ,n}.
In is the identity matrix of dimension n. 1n (resp. 0n) repre-
sents an n-dimensional vector with all of its elements being
1 (resp. 0). For a vector or matrix A, A⊤ denotes the trans-
pose of A and Rowi(A) is the ith row of A. ρ(A) represents
the spectral radius of A and det(A) is the determinant of
A. For real symmetric matrices P and Q, P ≻ (,≻,) Q
means that P−Q is positive (positive semi-, negative, neg-
ative semi-) definite, while for two vectors/matrices w,v of
the same dimension, w≤ v means that each entry of w is no
greater than the corresponding one of v. A⊗B denotes the
Kronecker product of matrices A and B. diag{a1,a2, . . . ,an}
represents a diagonal matrix with ai, i ∈ [n], on its diago-
nal. For a vector v, we use diag(v) to represent the diag-
onal matrix with the vector v on its diagonal. Denote by
col(z1, . . . ,zn) the column vector or matrix by pilling up zi,
i ∈ [n]. A matrix is consensual if its row vectors are the
same. For any real vector space S , denote by S ∗ the dual
space of S . 〈w,v〉 represents the inner product of w ∈S ∗
and v ∈ S . An operator Q : S → S ∗ is said to be pos-
itive definite if 〈Qv,v〉 ≥ 0 for all v ∈ S \{0} and self-
adjoint if 〈Qw,v〉 = 〈Qv,w〉 for all w,v ∈ S . The norm on
S induced by a positive definite and self-adjoint opera-
tor Q is defined as ‖v‖ =√〈Qv,v〉. A mapping g : S →
S ∗ is said to be strongly monotone with a constant µ
on P ⊆ S if 〈g(w)− g(v),w− v〉 ≥ µ‖w− v‖2 for any
w,v ∈ P . In this paper, the real vector spaces S and S ∗
are S = S ∗ = Rn or S = S ∗ = Rn×q (or Rni×qi). If
S =S ∗ =Rn×q (or Rni×qi), the inner product is defined as
〈w,v〉 :=
√
trace[w⊤v], which is the Frobenius inner product.
If S = S ∗ = Rn, the inner product 〈w,v〉 is the standard
dot product in Rn. Denote by ‖ · ‖F and ‖ · ‖ the Frobenius
norm and the Euclidean norm induced by the Frobenius in-
ner product and the standard dot product, respectively, i.e.,
‖v‖F :=
√
trace[v⊤v] and ‖w‖ :=
√
w⊤w for v ∈ Rn×q (or
R
ni×qi) and w ∈ Rn.
An undirected graph, denoted as G = (V ,E ,A), where V =
{1,2, . . . ,N}, E ⊆ V ×V and A = (ai j) ∈ RN×N represent
the vertex set, the edge set and theweighted adjacencymatrix
of G , respectively. The weights are defined as ai j > 0 if
( j, i) ∈ E and ai j = 0 otherwise. aii > 0 for all i ∈ [N] in this
paper. For an edge (i, j), i is called a neighbor of j. Denote by
Ni the sets of the neighbors of node i, i.e., Ni = { j : ( j, i) ∈
E }. A path from node i1 to node il is composed of a sequence
of edges (ih, ih+1), h = 1,2, . . . , l− 1. An undirected graph
G is said to be connected if for any vertices i, j, there is a
path from node i to node j.
2
2 Problem formulation
This paper is concerned with the multi-cluster noncoopera-
tive game, which is conducted bym clusters. Each cluster i∈
[m] is a virtual self-interested player and contains ni agents
communicating via an undirected graph Gi = ([ni],Ei,Ai). In
the meantime, each cluster designates a representative agent
to interact with other representative agents from other clus-
ters through an undirected communication topology G0 =
([m],E0,A0). Without loss of generality, it is supposed that
the representative agent in every cluster is the first agent.
The number of all the agents in this game is n := ∑mi=1 ni.
The concepts of strategy variables and payoff functions of
the multi-cluster game are given as follows.
• The strategy variable of agent j in cluster i is de-
noted as xi j ∈ Rqi . Let xi = col(xi1, . . . ,xini) ∈ Rniqi be
the strategy variable of cluster i and x−i is the joint
action of all the other clusters except that of i, i.e.,
x−i = col(x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xm). The strategy variable
of this game is defined as x= col(x1, . . . ,xm)∈RN , where
N := ∑mi=1niqi. The agents in the same cluster cooperate
to reach a common strategy that minimizes the payoff
function of the cluster. However, all the agents only know
local information from their neighbors through communi-
cations, i.e., under a partial-decision information setting.
• The payoff function of cluster i, fi :RN →R, is defined as
fi(xi,x−i) =
1
ni
ni
∑
j=1
fi j(xi j ,Γi(x−i)), (1)
where fi j(xi j,Γi(x−i)) is only available to agent j in
cluster i and Γi(x−i) ∈ Rq−qi with q := ∑mi=1 qi is the
stacked strategies of the representative agents of all
the clusters except that of cluster i, i.e., Γi(x−i) =
col(x11, . . . ,xi−1,1,xi+1,1, . . . ,xm1). Cluster i ∈ [m] aims to
choose a strategy xi = col(xi1, . . . ,xini) with xi j = xil for
j, l ∈ [ni] that minimize its own payoff function fi(xi,x−i)
under x−i.
Note that the strategies of agents in the same cluster are
ensured to reach an agreement. A strategy profile (x∗i ,x
∗
−i)
is called an NE of the formulated cluster game if x∗i j = x
∗
il
for all j, l ∈ [ni], and for all i ∈ [m],
fi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i)≤ fi(xi,x∗−i), xi = 1ni⊗ yi, ∀yi ∈Rqi . (2)
The objective of this paper is to design a distributed discrete-
time algorithm to find an NE of the studied multi-cluster
game.
Remark 1 The formulated cluster game can model the co-
existence of competition and cooperation simultaneously
and subsume noncooperative games and distributed opti-
mization as special cases. Specifically, if ni= 1 for all i∈ [m],
the multi-cluster game is a noncooperative game among m
players [11–16]. If m= 1, the considered problem is reduced
to the distributed optimization problem, which has been in-
vestigated such as in [17–22].
To proceed, some standard assumptions are listed below.
Assumption 1 Graphs G0,G1, . . . ,Gm are undirected and
connected. All adjacency matrices A0,A1, . . . ,Am are row
and column stochastic, i.e., A01m = 1m, 1
⊤
mA0 = 1
⊤
m , Ai1ni =
1ni , 1
⊤
ni
Ai = 1
⊤
ni
, i ∈ [m].
This assumption is standard in distributed discrete-time al-
gorithms, such as distributed optimization, consensus, and
NE seeking in noncooperative games [11, 14, 15, 19].
Assumption 2 For every j ∈ [ni], i ∈ [m], local payoff
function fi j(xi j,Γi(x−i)) is continuously differentiable and
the gradient ∇i fi j(xi j ,Γi(x−i)) :=
∂ fi j(xi j ,Γi(x−i))
∂xi j
is Lipschitz
continuous on Rqi , i.e., for some constant Li j > 0,
‖∇i fi j(xi j,Γi(x−i))−∇i fi j(x˜i j,Γi(x˜−i))‖
≤ Li j
∥∥∥∥∥
[
xi j− x˜i j
Γi(x−i))−Γi(x˜−i)
]∥∥∥∥∥ . (3)
The condition in Assumption 2 is the Li j-smooth condition
of the local payoff function fi j , which is commonly used
in distributed optimization, consensus, and NE seeking in
noncooperative games [11, 14, 15, 19].
Denote for i ∈ [m],
gi(xi,x−i)
:= col (∇i fi1(xi1,Γi(x−i)), . . . ,∇i fini(xini ,Γi(x−i))) ∈ Rniqi .
The game mapping F :RN → RN is defined as follows:
F(x) := col(g1(x1,x−1), . . . ,gm(xm,x−m)). (4)
Assumption 3 The mappings diag{ In1q1
n1
, . . . ,
Inmqm
nm
}F(x)
and F(x) are strongly monotone on the set Ω := {col(1n1⊗
y1, . . . ,1nm ⊗ ym) : yi ∈ Rqi , i ∈ [m]} with constants µ1 > 0
and µ2 > 0, respectively.
Assumption 3 is equivalent to that for any y= col(y1, . . . ,ym),
z = col(z1, . . . ,zm) with yi,zi ∈ Rqi , i ∈ [m], the following
inequalities hold:
m
∑
i=1
ni
∑
j=1
1
ni
(∇i fi j(y)−∇i fi j(z))⊤ (yi− zi)]
≥ µ1
m
∑
i=1
ni‖yi− zi‖2 ≥ µ1‖y− z‖2, (5)
3
m∑
i=1
ni
∑
j=1
(∇i fi j(y)−∇i fi j(z))⊤ (yi− zi)]
≥ µ2
m
∑
i=1
ni‖yi− zi‖2 ≥ µ2‖y− z‖2, (6)
indicating that mappings
col
(
1
n1
n1
∑
j=1
∇1 f1 j(y), . . . ,
1
nm
nm
∑
j=1
∇m fmj(y)
)
and
col
(
n1
∑
j=1
∇1 f1 j(y), . . . ,
nm
∑
j=1
∇m fmj(y)
)
are strongly monotone on Rq with constants µ1 and µ2,
respectively. As 1
ni
∑
ni
j=1 ∇i fi j(xi j,Γi(x−i)) is a local payoff
function of cluster i, mappings diag{ In1q1
n1
, . . . ,
Inmqm
nm
}F(x)
andF(x) are indeed the samewhen ni= 1, i∈ [m]. The strong
monotonicity of diag{ In1q1
n1
, . . . ,
Inmqm
nm
}F(x) on the set Ω :=
{col(1n1 ⊗ y1, . . . ,1nm ⊗ ym) : yi ∈ Rqi , i ∈ [m]} can ensure
the existence and uniqueness of the NE of the studied multi-
cluster game, which is consistent with the condition ensuring
the the existence and uniqueness of the NE of conventional
noncooperative games in [14, 15].
Note that in the multi-cluster game, the agents in the same
cluster are required to reach an agreement to minimize the
payoff function of the cluster, thus x∗ ∈ Ω is an NE if and
only if
ni
∑
j=1
∇i fi j(x
∗
i j,Γi(x
∗
−i)) = 0qi ,
x∗i j = x
∗
il , (7)
for all j, l ∈ [ni],∀i ∈ [m].
3 Main result
In this section, a distributed discrete-time algorithm is
proposed for NE seeking of the considered multi-cluster
game. To deal with the partial-decision information sce-
nario, where the agents can access the local information
exchanged through local communication, it is assumed that
each agent j in cluster i maintains a local variable
x(i j) = col(x(1)i j, . . . ,x(m)i j) ∈Rq, (8)
which is the estimation of the joint strategy of the rep-
resentative agents, i.e., col(x11, . . . ,xm1). Here q = ∑
m
i=1 qi,
x(s)i j ∈ Rqs is the estimate of xs1 at the agent j in cluster i
and x(i)i j = xi j. Also, the estimates of other representative
agents except that of cluster i is compactly denoted by
x−(i j) = col(x(1)i j, . . . ,x(i−1)i j,x(i+1)i j, . . . ,x(m)i j). (9)
A distributed gradient tracking algorithm (DGT) is proposed
as in Algorithm 1 to learn the NE of the multi-cluster game.
Algorithm 1 Distributed Gradient Tracking Algorithm
(DGT)
Each agent j in cluster i maintains vector variables xt(i j) =
col(xt(1)i j, . . . ,x
t
(m)i j) ∈ Rq and vti j ∈ Rqi at iteration t.
Initialization: Initialize x0(i j) ∈ Rq arbitrarily and let v0i j =
∇i fi j(x
0
i j,x
0
−(i j)).
Iteration: For t ≥ 0, every agent j in cluster i processes the
following update:
xt+1i j =


1
2
ni
∑
l=1
a
jl
i x
t
il +
1
2
m
∑
h=1
aih0 x
t
(i)h j−αvti j, j = 1,
ni
∑
l=1
a
jl
i x
t
il−αvti j, j 6= 1,
(10a)
xt+1(s)i j =


1
2
ni
∑
l=1
a
jl
i x
t
(s)il +
1
2
m
∑
h=1
aih0 x
t
(s)h j, j = 1,s 6= i,
ni
∑
l=1
a
jl
i x
t
(s)il , j 6= 1,s 6= i,
(10b)
vt+1i j =
ni
∑
l=1
a
jl
i v
t
il +∇i fi j(x
t+1
i j ,x
t+1
−(i j))−∇i fi j(xti j,xt−(i j)),
(10c)
where aih0 is the (i,h) element of A0, a
jl
i is the ( j, l) element
of Ai, i ∈ [m], and α > 0 is the step-size to be determined.
Algorithm 1 is designed relying on three parts: inter-cluster
update mechanism, intra-cluster update mechanism and esti-
mation of the gradients of local clusters’ payoff functions. In
Algorithm 1, the inter-cluster update mechanism is reflected
at variables xt(i1), i ∈ [m], since only the first agents of clus-
ters can communicate locally via communication topology
G0. Meanwhile, the update of x
t
(i1), i ∈ [m] should also com-
bine the intra-cluster communication via graph Gi, i ∈ [m].
The non-representative agents only need to update their local
variables by considering intra-cluster communication. That
is, xt(i j) for j 6= 1, i∈ [m] follow the intra-cluster updatemech-
anism. vti j is an auxiliary variable to estimate the gradient
of the payoff function of cluster i at the estimated strategy
of other representative agents, i.e., 1
ni
∑
ni
j=1∇i fi j(x
t
i j ,x
t
−(i j)).
Every agent updates its local variables xt(i j) and v
t
i j only by
local information. Thus this algorithm is distributed.
The convergence result of Algorithm 1 is presented in the
following.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1–3, xti j generated by Al-
gorithm 1 converges to x∗i j at a linear convergence rate,
where x∗ is the NE of the multi-cluster game satisfying (7),
if 0< α <min{α∗, m+n
2(µ1+µ2)
}, where α∗ > 0 is the smallest
4
positive root of the equation det(I3−Φ(α∗)) = 0 with Φ(α)
being a matrix defined in (57).
Proof. The proof is postponed to Section 4.
Remark 2 If there is only one cluster in the studied multi-
cluster game, i.e., m= 1, then Algorithm 1 and Theorem 1
will reduce to the result for distributed optimization, which
is consistent with that in [19]. If there is only one agent
in each cluster, i.e., ni = 1, i ∈ [m], then the studied game
becomes a conventional noncooperative game in [11–14]
and Algorithm 1 is the gradient-based algorithm in [15].
Remark 3 In comparison, the existing algorithms for NE
seeking of multi-cluster games in [26–29] were designed
in continuous-time and under full-decision information,
while Algorithm 1 here is a discrete-time algorithm under
a partial-decision information setting, and meanwhile, an
upper bound is provided for the step size α to ensure a
linear convergence rate.
4 Proof of the main result
In this section, the proof of Theorem 1 is given. For con-
venient analysis, the estimation matrix xt ∈Rn×q with n :=
∑mi=1 ni is defined as
xt := col(xt1, . . . ,x
t
m), (11)
where
xti :=


(
xt(i1)
)⊤
...(
xt(ini)
)⊤

 ∈Rni×q, i ∈ [m]. (12)
Similarly, denote vti := col((v
t
i1)
⊤, . . . ,(vtini)
⊤) ∈ Rni×qi , i ∈
[m], and V t := diag{vt1, . . . ,vtm} ∈Rn×q. Considering all the
n agents in the multi-cluster game, the entire communica-
tion topology G among the n agents is composed of graphs
G0,G1, . . . ,Gm with the vertex set being all the n agents and
adjacency matrix A ∈ Rn×n being given as
A =


A˜1+B11 B12 · · · B1m
B21 A˜2+B22 · · · B2m
...
...
...
Bm1 Bm2 · · · A˜m+Bmm

 , (13)
where A˜i ∈ Rni×ni is equal to the adjacency matrix Ai of Gi
except that the first row Row1(A˜i) is
1
2
Row1(Ai) and Bi j ∈
R
ni×n j has the (1,1) element as 1
2
a
i j
0 and other elements as
0, j ∈ [ni], i ∈ [m]. Then A is a row stochastic matrix and
has positive diagonal entries. By the above notations, (10)
can be rewritten into a compact form as follows:
xt+1 = A xt −αV t , (14)
vt+1i = Aiv
t
i+Gi(x
t+1
i )−Gi(xti), (15)
where
Gi(x
t
i) =


(
∇i fi1(x
t
i1,x
t
−(i1))
)⊤
...(
∇i fini(x
t
ini
,xt−(ini))
)⊤

 , i ∈ [m]. (16)
Note that it is required that all the agents in the same cluster
take the same strategy when reaching the NE x∗, namely,
in cluster i, the strategies x∗i j and x
∗
il of agent j and agent
l, respectively, should be equal. For ease of notations, we
can denote the NE as x˜∗ = col(x˜∗1, . . . , x˜
∗
m) ∈ Rq, where q =
∑mi=1 qi, x˜
∗
i ∈ Rqi is the strategy of agents in cluster i at the
NE x∗, i.e., x˜∗i = x
∗
i j for j ∈ [ni] and i ∈ [m]. Then, the proof
of Theorem 1 is equivalent to showing that the sequence xt
converges to a consensual matrix 1n(x˜
∗)⊤.
Before giving the detailed proof of Theorem 1, we first in-
troduce some new concepts and lemmas which will be used
in the sequel. Under Assumption 1, A is a row stochastic
matrix with a simple eigenvalue 1. Then,A has a left eigen-
vector pi ∈Rn corresponding to eigenvalue 1 satisfying that
pi⊤A = pi⊤, pi⊤1n = 1 and every element of pi is positive.
Indeed, by the structure of A in (13), pi can be obtained in
the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, the left eigenvector pi ∈Rn
of matrix A in (13) corresponding to eigenvalue 1 such that
pi⊤A = pi⊤ and pi⊤1n = 1 is given as pi = col(pi1, . . . ,pim)
with pi i being pi i = col( 2
n+m ,
1
n+m , . . . ,
1
n+m) ∈ Rni , i ∈ [m].
Moreover, 1⊤nipi
i = ni+1
n+m , i ∈ [m].
Proof. By splitting the adjacency matrices Ai of Gi as
Ai =
[
Ai11 A
i
12
Ai21 A
i
22
]
, (17)
where Ai11 ∈ R, Ai12 ∈ R1×(ni−1), Ai21 ∈ Rni−1, Ai22 ∈
R
(ni−1)×(ni−1), and i ∈ [m], one can rewrite A˜i as
A˜i =
[
1
2
Ai11
1
2
Ai12
Ai21 A
i
22
]
, i ∈ [m]. (18)
Accordingly, Bhi can be partitioned as
Bhi =
[
1
2
ahi0 01×(ni−1)
0nh−1 0(nh−1)×(ni−1)
]
, h, i ∈ [m]. (19)
5
Let pi i = (pi i1,(pi
i
2)
⊤)⊤, where pi i1 ∈ R, i ∈ [m]. Then from
pi⊤A = pi⊤, it can be obtained that for i ∈ [m],
(pi i)⊤A˜i+
m
∑
h=1
(pih)⊤Bhi = (pi i)⊤,
which is equivalent to
[pi i1,(pi
i
2)
⊤]
[
1
2
Ai11
1
2
Ai12
Ai21 A
i
22
]
+
m
∑
h=1
[pih1 ,(pi
h
2 )
⊤]
[
1
2
ahi0 01×(ni−1)
0nh−1 0(nh−1)×(ni−1)
]
= [pi i1,(pi
i
2)
⊤]. (20)
Note that Ai1ni = 1ni , then right multiplying 1ni on both sides
of (20) yields that
[pi i1,(pi
i
2)
⊤]
[
1
2
1ni−1
]
+
m
∑
h=1
[pih1 ,(pi
h
2 )
⊤]
[
1
2
ahi0
0ni−1
]
= pi i1+(pi
i
2)
⊤1ni−1,
that is,
1
2
pi i1+(pi
i
2)
⊤1ni−1+
1
2
m
∑
h=1
pih1a
hi
0 = pi
i
1+(pi
i
2)
⊤1ni−1, i ∈ [m].
Thus,
m
∑
h=1
pih1a
hi
0 = pi
i
1, i ∈ [m], from which one can see
(pi11 , . . . ,pi
m
1 )A0 = (pi
1
1 , . . . ,pi
m
1 ). (21)
Therefore, the vector col(pi11 , . . . ,pi
m
1 ) constructed by the first
elements of pi i, i ∈ [m], is a left eigenvector of A0 corre-
sponding to eigenvalue 1. Under Assumption 1, since G0 is a
connected graph and A0 is a row and column stochastic ma-
trix, col(pi11 , . . . ,pi
m
1 ) should satisfy that pi
1
1 = · · ·= pim1 = ϖ
for some ϖ ∈ R. Consequently, (20) can be rewritten as
[
1
2
ϖ ,(pi i2)
⊤
][
Ai11 A
i
12
Ai21 A
i
22
]
+
m
∑
h=1
[
1
2
ϖahi0 ,01×(ni−1)]
= [ϖ ,(pi i2)
⊤]. (22)
Also from Assumption 1, 1⊤mA0 = 1⊤m , then for i ∈ [m],
∑mh=1 a
hi
0 = 1 and (22) becomes[
1
2
ϖ ,(pi i2)
⊤
]
Ai+
[
1
2
ϖ ,0ni−1
]
=
[
ϖ ,(pi i2)
⊤
]
,
i.e., [
1
2
ϖ ,(pi i2)
⊤
]
Ai =
[
1
2
ϖ ,(pi i2)
⊤
]
. (23)
Hence, for i ∈ [m], [ 1
2
ϖ ,(pi i2)
⊤] is a left eigenvector of Ai
corresponding to eigenvalue 1, thus, under Assumption 1,
one has
pi i2 =
1
2
ϖ1ni−1, i ∈ [m]. (24)
Note that 1= pi⊤1n, then 1= ∑mi=1(1+
ni−1
2
)ϖ = n+m
2
ϖ , in-
dicating ϖ = 2
n+m and pi
i = col( 2
n+m ,
1
n+m . . . ,
1
n+m). The last
claim can be easily verified and the proof is thus completed.

Based on pi = col(pi1, . . . ,pin), two inner products, weighted
dot product and weighted Frobenius inner product, are, re-
spectively, defined as follows: for x,y ∈Rn and x,y ∈Rn×q,
〈x,y〉pi := 〈diag(pi)x,y〉, (25)
〈x,y〉pi := 〈diag(pi)x,y〉. (26)
Then the induced weighted Euclidean norm and Frobenius
norm are, respectively,
‖x‖pi :=
√
〈diag(pi)x,x〉= ‖diag(√pi)x‖, (27)
‖x‖piF :=
√
〈diag(pi)x,x〉= ‖diag(√pi)x‖F , (28)
where
√
pi := col(
√
pi1, . . . ,
√
pin). We also denote by ‖B‖pi
the matrix norm of matrix B∈Rn×n induced by the weighted
Euclidean norm. Then
‖B‖pi = ‖diag(
√
pi)Bdiag(
√
pi)−1‖. (29)
The following results can be obtained.
Lemma 2
1) For two positive semi-definite matrices P,Q∈Rn×n, if P
Q, then trace[P]≥ trace[Q]. Moreover, for any A ∈ Rn×n,
B ∈Rn×q, we have ‖AB‖F ≤ ‖A‖‖B‖F .
2) The Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖ and the weighted Euclidean
norm ‖ · ‖pi are equivalent. Specifically, for any x ∈ Rn,
there holds:
√
pimin‖x‖ ≤ ‖x‖pi ≤
√
pimax‖x‖, (30)
where pimin := min{pii, i ∈ [n]} = 1n+m and pimax :=
max{pii, i ∈ [n]}= 2n+m .
3) The Frobenius norm ‖ · ‖F and the weighted Frobenius
norm ‖ ·‖piF are equivalent. Specifically, for any x∈Rn×q,
the following inequality holds:
√
pimin‖x‖F ≤ ‖x‖piF ≤
√
pimax‖x‖F . (31)
4) Under Assumption 1, for any x ∈ Rn and x ∈ Rn×q, one
has
‖A x−A∞x‖pi ≤ σ‖x−A∞x‖pi , (32)
‖A x−A∞x‖piF ≤ σ‖x−A∞x‖piF , (33)
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where A∞ := 1npi
⊤ and σ := ‖A −A∞‖pi < 1.
Proof. 1) Note that for two positive semi-definite ma-
trices P,Q, if P  Q, then P − Q  0, implying that
trace[P−Q] ≥ 0. Therefore, trace[P]− trace[Q] ≥ 0, that
is, trace[P] ≥ trace[Q]. Moreover, for any A ∈ Rn×n and
B ∈ Rn×q, B⊤A⊤AB ‖A⊤A‖B⊤B= ‖A‖2B⊤B, then
‖AB‖F =
√
trace[B⊤A⊤AB]
≤
√
‖A‖2trace[B⊤B] = ‖A‖‖B‖F.
2) By the notation in (27), for any x ∈ Rn,
√
pimin
n
∑
i=1
x2i ≤ ‖x‖pi =
√
n
∑
i=1
piix2i ≤
√
pimax
n
∑
i=1
x2i
which implies that (30) holds.
3) Note that for any x ∈ Rn×q,
piminx
⊤x x⊤diag(pi)x pimaxx⊤x.
Then by the definition in (28) and 1) in this lemma, it holds
that √
trace[piminx⊤x]≤ ‖x‖piF =
√
trace[x⊤diag(pi)x]
≤
√
trace[pimaxx⊤x].
Then (31) is proved.
4) Referring to Lemma 1 in [30], one can obtain that (32) and
σ = ‖A −A∞‖pi < 1 hold. It suffices to prove (33). Since
A x−A∞x = (A −A∞)(x−A∞x),
where A A∞ = A∞A = A∞A∞ = A∞ is used, one has that
‖A x−A∞x‖piF
= ‖diag(√pi)(A −A∞)(x−A∞x)‖F
= ‖diag(√pi)(A −A∞)diag(
√
pi)−1
× diag(√pi)(x−A∞x)‖F
≤ ‖diag(√pi)(A −A∞)diag(
√
pi)−1‖
×‖diag(√pi)(x−A∞x)‖F
= ‖A −A∞‖pi‖x−A∞x‖piF
= σ‖x−A∞x‖piF .
where the inequality is obtained based on 1) of this lemma.
The proof is completed. 
Several other necessary lemmas for proving Theorem 1 are
listed as follows.
Lemma 3 ( [31], Theorem 1) For a complex matrix P0 of
size n×n, assume that P0 has a simple eigenvalue λ0. Denote
by u,w the right and left eigenvectors of P0 corresponding
to the eigenvalue λ0, respectively, which are normalized so
that wHu = 1, where wH represents the conjugate transpose
of w. Let τ0 be a complex number and P(τ) be a complex-
valued matrix function of a complex parameter τ that is
analytic in a neighborhood of τ0, satisfying P(τ0) =P0. Then
P(τ) has a unique eigenvalue λ (τ), which is analytic in a
neighborhood of τ0 and satisfies
i) λ (τ0) = λ0;
ii)
dλ (τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ0
= wH
dP(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ0
u,
where
dλ (τ)
dτ
∣∣∣
τ=τ0
,
dP(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣
τ=τ0
are the derivatives of λ (τ)
and P(τ) at τ = τ0, respectively.
Lemma 4 ( [32]) Under Assumption 1, for any i ∈ [m],
σi :=
∥∥∥∥∥Ai− 1ni1
⊤
ni
ni
∥∥∥∥∥< 1. (34)
Lemma 5 ( [33]) An irreducible nonnegative matrix M ∈
R
n×n is primitive if it has at least one non-zero diagonal
entry.
Lemma 6 ( [33]) For an irreducible nonnegative matrix
M ∈Rn×n, ρ(M) is an algebraically simple eigenvalue of M.
Then the proof of Theorem 1 is given as follows.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Consider (15). Note that Ai ∈ Rni×ni is a row and column
stochastic matrix, then
1⊤niv
t+1
i
= 1⊤niv
t
i+
ni
∑
j=1
[
∇i fi j(x
t+1
i j ,x
t+1
−(i j))
]⊤
−
ni
∑
j=1
[
∇i fi j(x
t
i j,x
t
−(i j))
]⊤
,
which indicates that
1⊤niv
t+1
i −
ni
∑
j=1
[
∇i fi j(x
t+1
i j ,x
t+1
−(i j))
]⊤
= 01×qi,
since the initial value v0i j = ∇i fi j(x
0
i j,x
0
−(i j)), j ∈ [ni]. There-
fore, for any i ∈ [m],
1⊤niv
t
i =
ni
∑
j=1
[
∇i fi j(x
t
i j,x
t
−(i j))
]⊤
. (35)
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Denote
xtpi := (pi
⊤xt)⊤ ∈ Rq, (36)
vti :=
1ni1
⊤
ni
ni
vti ∈Rni×qi , (37)
then A∞x
t = 1n(x
t
pi)
⊤. In the following, we investigate the
bounds of norms ‖xt −A∞xt‖piF , ‖A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤‖F and
∑mi=1 ‖vti− vti‖F in four steps.
Step 1. For ‖xt−A∞xt‖piF , by iteration (14), we have that
‖xt+1−A∞xt+1‖piF
= ‖A xt −αV t −A∞A xt −αA∞V t‖piF
≤ ‖A xt −A∞A xt‖piF +α‖(In−A∞)V t‖piF
≤ ‖A xt −A∞xt‖piF +α
√
pimax‖(In−A∞)V t‖F
≤ σ‖xt −A∞xt‖piF +α
√
pimax‖In−A∞‖‖V t‖F , (38)
where the first inequality is based on the norm property, the
second inequality depends on A∞A =A∞ and 3) in Lemma
2, and the third inequality is by (33) and 1) in Lemma 2.
Step 2. For ‖A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤‖F , denote
gi(x
t) :=
1ni
ni
ni
∑
j=1
(
∇i fi j(x
t
pi)
)⊤
, i ∈ [m], (39)
where xtpi is defined in (36), then by iteration (14), one can
get that
‖A∞xt+1− 1n(x˜∗)⊤‖F
= ‖A∞A xt −αA∞V t − 1n(x˜∗)⊤‖F
= ‖A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤−αA∞diag{g1(xtpi), . . . ,gm(xtpi)}
+αA∞diag{g1(xtpi), . . . ,gm(xtpi)}−αA∞diag{vt1, . . . ,vtm}
+αA∞diag{vt1, . . . ,vtm}−αA∞V t‖F
≤ ‖A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤−αA∞diag{g1(xtpi), . . . ,gm(xtpi)}‖F
+α‖A∞diag{g1(xtpi)− vt1, . . . ,gm(xtpi)− vtm}‖F
+α‖A∞diag{vt1, . . . ,vtm}−A∞V t‖F , (40)
where A∞A = A∞ and the norm property are applied. For
the first term on the right side of (40), there holds
‖A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤−αA∞diag{g1(xtpi), . . . ,gm(xtpi)}‖2F
= ‖A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤‖2F
− 2α
〈
A∞diag{g1(xtpi), . . . ,gm(xtpi)},A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤
〉
+α2‖A∞diag{g1(xtpi), . . . ,gm(xtpi)}‖2F . (41)
Denote xtpi = col(x
t
pi1, . . . ,x
t
pim) with x
t
pi i ∈ Rqi , i ∈ [m], then
by A∞ = 1npi
⊤ and A∞xt = 1n(xtpi)⊤, one has
〈
A∞diag{g1(xtpi), . . . ,gm(xtpi)},A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤
〉
= trace
[
diag{g⊤1 (xtpi), . . . ,g⊤m(xtpi)}A ⊤∞ (A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤)
]
= trace
[
diag{g⊤1 (xtpi), . . . ,g⊤m(xtpi)}pi1⊤n 1n(xtpi − x˜∗)⊤
]
= n
m
∑
i=1
(pi i)⊤1ni
ni
ni
∑
j=1
(
∇i fi j(x
t
pi)
)⊤
(xtpi i− x˜∗i )
=
n
n+m
m
∑
i=1
ni+ 1
ni
ni
∑
j=1
(
∇i fi j(x
t
pi)−∇i fi j(x˜∗)
)⊤
(xtpi i− x˜∗i )
≥ n
n+m
(µ1+ µ2)‖xtpi − x˜∗‖2
=
µ1+ µ2
n+m
‖A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤‖2F , (42)
where the fourth equality is obtained based on Lemma 1
and ∑
ni
j=1 ∇i fi j(x˜
∗) = 0qi , i ∈ [m], from (7), the inequality
is based on Assumption 3, and the last equality relies on
‖1nx⊤‖2F = n‖x‖2 for any x ∈ Rn. In addition,
‖A∞diag{g1(xtpi), . . . ,gm(xtpi)}‖2F
≤ ‖A∞‖2
m
∑
i=1
trace
[
(gi(x
t
pi))
⊤gi(x
t
pi)
]
= ‖A∞‖2
m
∑
i=1
1
ni
∥∥∥∥∥
ni
∑
j=1
∇i fi j(x
t
pi)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= ‖A∞‖2
m
∑
i=1
1
ni
∥∥∥∥∥
ni
∑
j=1
∇i fi j(x
t
pi)−
ni
∑
j=1
∇i fi j(x˜
∗)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ‖A∞‖2
m
∑
i=1
ni
∑
j=1
∥∥∇i fi j(xtpi)−∇i fi j(x˜∗)∥∥2
≤ ‖A∞‖2
m
∑
i=1
ni
∑
j=1
Li j
∥∥xtpi − x˜∗∥∥2
≤ L‖A∞‖2‖A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤‖2F , (43)
where L = max{Li j, i ∈ [m], j ∈ [ni]}, the first inequality is
based on the definition of the Frobenius norm and 1) in
Lemma 2, the second equality is by ∑
ni
j=1∇i fi j(x˜
∗)= 0qi , and
the third inequality is from Assumption 2. Then substituting
(42) and (43) into (41), it can be derived that
‖A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤−αA∞diag{g1(xtpi), . . . ,gm(xtpi)}‖2F
≤
(
1− 2α(µ1+ µ2)
m+ n
+α2L‖A∞‖2
)
‖A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤‖2F .
(44)
8
For the second term on the right side of (40), we have
α‖A∞diag{g1(xtpi)− vt1, . . . ,gm(xtpi)− vtm}‖F
≤ α‖A∞‖‖diag{g1(xtpi)− vt1, . . . ,gm(xtpi)− vtm}‖F
= α‖A∞‖
×
∥∥∥∥∥diag
{
1n1
n1
n1
∑
j=1
[
∇1 f1 j(x
t
pi)−∇1 f1 j(xt(1 j))
]⊤
, . . . ,
1nm
nm
nm
∑
j=1
[
∇m fmj(x
t
pi)−∇m fmj(xt(mj))
]⊤}∥∥∥∥∥
F
= α‖A∞‖
√√√√ m∑
i=1
1
ni
∥∥∥∥∥
ni
∑
j=1
[
∇i fi j(xtpi)−∇i fi j(xt(i j))
]∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ α‖A∞‖
√√√√ m∑
i=1
ni
∑
j=1
∥∥∥∇i fi j(xtpi)−∇i fi j(xt(i j))
∥∥∥2
≤ α‖A∞‖
√√√√ m∑
i=1
ni
∑
j=1
L2i j
∥∥∥xt(i j)− xtpi
∥∥∥2
≤ αL‖A∞‖
√√√√ m∑
i=1
ni
∑
j=1
∥∥∥xt(i j)− xtpi
∥∥∥2
= αL‖A∞‖‖xt−A∞xt‖F
≤ αL‖A∞‖pi−0.5min ‖xt−A∞xt‖piF , (45)
where the first inequality is based on 1) in Lemma 2, the first
equality is from (35), the third inequality is by Assumption
2, and the last inequality is obtained by 3) in Lemma 2. For
the third term on the right side of (40), we get
α‖A∞diag{vt1, . . . ,vtm}−A∞V t‖F
≤ α‖A∞‖‖diag{vt1− vt1, . . . ,vtm− vtm}‖F
= α‖A∞‖
√
m
∑
i=1
trace [(vti− vti)⊤(vti− vti)]
= α‖A∞‖
√
m
∑
i=1
∥∥vti− vti∥∥2F
≤ α‖A∞‖
m
∑
i=1
∥∥vti− vti∥∥F . (46)
Then, by substituting (44)–(46) into (40), we conclude that
‖A∞xt+1− 1n(x˜∗)⊤‖F
≤
√
1− 2α(µ1+ µ2)
m+ n
+α2L‖A∞‖2‖A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤‖F
+αL‖A∞‖pi−0.5min ‖xt−A∞xt‖piF
+α‖A∞‖
m
∑
i=1
∥∥vti− vti∥∥F . (47)
Step 3. For ∑mi=1 ‖vti− vti‖F , considering iteration (15), the
iteration of vti is got as
vt+1i = v
t
i +
1ni1
⊤
ni
ni
Gi(x
t+1
i )−
1ni1
⊤
ni
ni
Gi(x
t
i), (48)
where 1⊤niAi = 1
⊤
ni
is used. Then we obtain
‖vt+1i − vt+1i ‖F
=
∥∥∥∥∥Aivti+Gi(xt+1)−Gi(xt)− vti− 1ni1
⊤
ni
ni
Gi(x
t+1
i )
+
1ni1
⊤
ni
ni
Gi(x
t
i)
∥∥∥∥∥
F
≤ ‖Aivti− vti‖F +
∥∥∥∥∥Ini− 1ni1
⊤
ni
ni
∥∥∥∥∥‖Gi(xt+1)−Gi(xt)‖F
=
∥∥∥∥∥
(
Ai−
1ni1
⊤
ni
ni
)
(vti− vti)
∥∥∥∥∥
F
+ ‖Gi(xt+1)−Gi(xt)‖F
≤
∥∥∥∥∥Ai− 1ni1
⊤
ni
ni
∥∥∥∥∥‖vti− vti‖F
+
√√√√ ni∑
j=1
∥∥∥∇i fi j(xt+1(i j))−∇i fi j(xt(i j))
∥∥∥2
≤ σi‖vti− vti‖F +
√√√√ ni∑
j=1
L2i j
∥∥∥xt+1(i j) − xt(i j)
∥∥∥2
≤ σi‖vti− vti‖F +L‖xt+1i − xti‖F , (49)
where the second equality is obtained based on Ai1ni = 1ni
and ‖Ini−
1ni1
⊤
ni
ni
‖ = 1, the second inequality is based on 1)
in Lemma 2 and (16), the third inequality is from Lemma
4 and Assumption 2, and the last inequality hinges on the
structure of xti in (12). Therefore,
m
∑
i=1
‖vt+1i − vt+1i ‖F
≤
m
∑
i=1
σi‖vti− vti‖F +L
m
∑
i=1
‖xt+1i − xti‖F
≤ σmax
m
∑
i=1
‖vti− vti‖F +L
√
m‖xt+1− xt‖F , (50)
where σmax :=max{σi, i ∈ [m]} ∈ (0,1).
Step 4. In this step, we discuss the bounds of norms ‖V t‖F
and ‖xt+1− xt‖F appearing in (38) and (50), respectively.
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By (14), we have
‖xt+1− xt‖F
= ‖A xt −αV t − xt‖F
= ‖(A − In)(xt −A∞xt)−αV t‖F
≤ ‖A − In‖pi−0.5min ‖xt−A∞xt‖piF +α‖V t‖F , (51)
whereA A∞ =A∞ and 1), 3) in Lemma 2 are used. Recalling
V t = diag{vt1, . . . ,vtm}, it can be derived that
‖V t‖F =
√
m
∑
i=1
trace [(vti)
⊤vti ]
=
√
m
∑
i=1
‖vti‖2F
≤
m
∑
i=1
‖vti‖F . (52)
Note that
‖vti‖F = ‖vti− vti + vti‖F
≤ ‖vti− vti‖F + ‖vti‖F , (53)
and
‖vti‖F =
√
trace
[
1
n2i
(vti)
⊤1ni1⊤ni1ni1
⊤
ni
vti
]
=
1√
ni
‖1⊤nivti‖
=
1√
ni
∥∥∥∥∥
ni
∑
j=1
[
∇i fi j(x
t
(i j))−∇i fi j(x˜∗)
]⊤∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1√
ni
ni
∑
j=1
∥∥∥∇i fi j(xt(i j))−∇i fi j(x˜∗)∥∥∥
≤ 1√
ni
ni
∑
j=1
Li j
∥∥∥xt(i j)− x˜∗∥∥∥
≤ 1√
ni
L
ni
∑
j=1
‖xt(i j)− x˜∗‖
≤ L‖xt(i)− 1ni(x˜∗)⊤‖F , (54)
where L= max{Li j, i ∈ [m], j ∈ [ni]}, and the third equality
is based on (35) and ∑
ni
j=1∇i fi j(x˜
∗) = 0ni . Thus, it can be
seen from (52)–(54) that
‖V t‖F ≤
m
∑
i=1
‖vti− vti‖F +L
m
∑
i=1
‖xt(i)− 1ni(x˜∗)⊤‖F
≤
m
∑
i=1
‖vti− vti‖F +L
√
m‖xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤‖F
≤
m
∑
i=1
‖vti− vti‖F +L
√
mpi−0.5min ‖xt−A∞xt‖piF
+L
√
m‖A∞xt − 1n(x˜∗)⊤‖F . (55)
Denote ξ t = (‖xt−A∞xt‖piF ,‖A∞xt−1n(x˜∗)⊤‖F ,∑mi=1‖vti−
vti‖F)⊤, then by (38), (47), (50), (51), (55), the iteration of
ξ t satisfies
ξ t+1 ≤Φ(α)ξ t , (56)
where
Φ(α) =


σ +αa11 αa12 αa13
αa21 φ(α) αa23
a1+αa31 αa32 σmax+αa33

 (57)
with
φ(α) =
√
1− 2α(µ1+ µ2)
m+ n
+α2L‖A∞‖2, (58)
and a11 =
√
pimax‖In−A∞‖L
√
mpi−0.5min , a12 =
√
pimax‖In−
A∞‖L
√
m, a13 =
√
pimax‖In − A∞‖, a21 = L‖A∞‖pi−0.5min ,
a23 = ‖A∞‖, a1 = L
√
m‖A − In‖pi−0.5min , a31 = L2mpi−0.5min ,
a32 = L
2m, a33 = L
√
m. The matrix Φ(α) is a continuous
matrix function with respect to α , and when α = 0, Φ(0) is
Φ(0) =


σ 0 0
0 1 0
a1 0 σmax

 , (59)
whose spectral radius is 1 since σ ,σmax ∈ (0,1). Note that
Φ(0) has the left and right eigenvectors corresponding to
eigenvalue 1 as u = (0,1,0)⊤, then by Lemma 3, Φ(α) has
a unique eigenvalue λ (α) in the neighborhood of α = 0
satisfying
dλ (α)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
= u⊤
dΦ(α)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
u
=
− 2(µ1+µ2)
m+n + 2αL‖A∞‖2
2
√
1− 2α(µ1+µ2)
m+n +α
2L‖A∞‖2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
α=0
=−µ1+ µ2
m+ n
< 0. (60)
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Thus, the spectral radius of Φ(α) is strictly smaller than 1
as α slightly increases from zero based on the continuity of
the spectral radius. Then there must exist a positive number
α∗ such that ρ(Φ(α)) < 1 for all α ∈ (0,α∗). To find α∗,
it can be seen that the graph associated with Φ(α) when
α > 0 consisting of 3 agents is strongly connected, and then
Φ(α) is irreducible [34]. By Lemmas 5 and 6, ρ(Φ(α))
is a simple eigenvalue of Φ(α) and all other eigenvalues
have absolute values of less than ρ(Φ(α)). Therefore, α∗
should be the smallest positive root of the equation det(I3−
Φ(α∗)) = 0. On the other hand, 1− 2α(µ1+µ2)
m+n +α
2L‖A∞‖2
in φ(α) of (58) should be nonnegative, which can be en-
sured if 1− 2α(µ1+µ2)
m+n ≥ 0, i.e., α ≤ m+n2(µ1+µ2) . Therefore,
for any 0 < α < max{α∗, m+n
2(µ1+µ2)
}, the three entries of
ξ t , ‖xt−A∞xt‖piF , ‖A∞xt−1n(x˜∗)⊤‖F , ∑mi=1 ‖vti−vti‖F will
convergence to zero in the order of ρ(Φ(α))t as t goes to
infinity. 
5 Example
In this section, we present a numerical example to illustrate
our algorithm. To this end, a Cournot Competition game is
considered as follows.
There are 5 father companies, which are regarded as clus-
ters in the multi-cluster game, and each father company
has 20 subsidiary companies, which are viewed as agents
in clusters. The father companies compete with each other
by adjusting the production quantity of goods. The sub-
sidiary companies affiliated with the same father company
produce components for this father company, cooperate to
reach an agreement and meanwhile ensure that the profit of
the father company is optimal. Assume that the subsidiary
companies in the same father company i can communi-
cate through a connected graph Gi and each father com-
pany appoints a subsidiary company to contact with other
represntative subsidiary companies from other father com-
panies through another connected graph G0. By regarding
the quantities of goods as strategy variables, denote by xi j
the quantity of goods of subsidiary company j in father
company i. The cost for producing components of goods
and the price of components for per unit product by sub-
sidiary company j in father company i are assumed to be
ci j = 5x
2
i j + i5xi j + i and pi j = 60i−∑5h=1 aih0 xh1, respec-
tively, where A0 = (a
ih
0 ) ∈ R5×5 is the adjacency matrix of
graph G0, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,20}, i,h ∈ {1,2,3,4,5}. Then the
payoff function of father company i is fi = ∑
20
j=1 fi j , where
fi j = ci j− xi jpi j.
This is a multi-cluster game studied in this paper. It can
be verified that Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied. By (7) and
a centralized method, the unique NE can be calculated as
x∗1 j = 3.9478, x
∗
2 j = 9.3400, x
∗
3 j = 14.7321, x
∗
4 j = 20.1243,
x∗5 j = 25.5165, where j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,20}. By our proposed
algorithm with α = 0.02, the sequence {xti j}, as well as the
estimate sequence {xt(s)i j} of the strategy of cluster s by
agent j in cluster i, converges to the unique NE, as shown
in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Trajectories of xt(s)i j, s, i ∈ {1,2,3,4,5}, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,20}.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the distributed NE seeking
problem for a class of multi-cluster noncooperative games
under a partial-decision information scenario. To design a
distributed algorithm, every agent needs to make estimations
of the strategies of other clusters at each iteration since each
agent only has access to its local payoff function coupled
with other clusters’ strategies and the neighbors’ informa-
tion. Then based on the inter- and intra-communication of
clusters, a distributed gradient tracking algorithm in discrete-
time was devised to find the unique NE of the multi-cluster
game. Rigorous convergence analysis with a linear conver-
gence rate was provided by introducing a weighted Frobe-
nius norm and a weighted Euclidean norm. To further study
generalizedNE seeking for the formulatedmulti-cluster non-
cooperative games with constrained action sets and inequal-
ity constraints under a partial-decision information scenario
is an interesting future research direction.
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